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It is an open secret among scientists that accurate pre-
dictions made on the basis of scientific laws are rare.
Only yesterday, in the dark age of Carnap and
Reichenbach, prediction was believed to be the fun-
damental feature of science. This unrealistic belief
went hand in hand with a preposterous confusion,
namely, the identification of all of science with phys-
ics. In that age of savage simplification, shining ex-
amples of prediction in science were the confirmations
of the special theory of relativity, the explanation of
the spectral lines of the hydrogen atom by quantum
mechanics, and sundry other pillars of progress
gleaned from the science of mechanics.
It took philosophers well over fifty years to carry out
a reality check on their philosophy of science and to
diagnose the normative disease that has plagued phi-
losophy in this century. A casual inspection of any
science other than physics or chemistry proves beyond
reasonable doubt that scientific prediction in the sense
of the positivists is at best a cruel joke. Zoology and
cosmology, economics and evolutionary biology are
only tangentially concerned with accurate prediction.
A description of the scientific enterprise pruned of
normative presuppositions lies still in the future.
Meanwhile, we may begin to chip away at the barri-
ers that stand in the way. One such barrier is the sys-
tematic misuse of language by philosophers and lo-
gicians. Common words are rudely deprived of the
multiple and contradictory meanings that they enjoy
in ordinary language; after the straitjacket of a fixed
meaning for every word is imposed, the door is shut
to realistic description.
We have chosen the word “is” as paradigmatic of the
constipation of meaning from which contemporary
philosophy is suffering. We describe some of the mul-
tiple senses of the question: “What is mathematics?”
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The reigning orthodoxy of philosophy identifies the
uses of “is” with the restricted uses of the word “is”
in Fregean logic. Logic has achieved in this century a
state of perfection that few mathematical theories have
matched. However (or perhaps for this very reason),
logical reasoning has become totally divorced from
actual reasoning, the kind that is found in real life. In
most worldly circumstances, logic shines by its ab-
sence. A compelling logical argument is the last
weapon of the rhetorician, a recourse to be appealed
to in desperate situations, when all else has failed.
It is no accident that substantial applications of
Fregean logic are found daily in computer science. The
crazies of the eighties, who pretended to simulate the
mind with primitive computers, have succeeded, by
a display of illiterate reductionism, in clearing up the
abyss that separates human discourse from logical
deduction.
It is thus no surprise to realize that the meanings of
the word “is” prescribed by logicians are a lot closer
to the ranting of Ayerian philosophy-fiction than to
the richness of senses of the word “is” in everyday
writing and conversation.
The accusation of being “illogical” may be leveled at
us. Our retort will be a call to duty: realistic descrip-
tion is a paramount task of the philosopher. The first
step in a philosophical description consists in admit-
ting that the real is seldom rational and the rational is
seldom real. An “Abgrund” separates “Verstand”
from “Vernunft.” Philosophical description must
grapple with open-ended varieties of irreducible cases,
with contradictory and ambiguous conclusions which
Enlightenment Reason has ignored.
It is our contention that the word “is” in the question
“What is mathematics?” does not have a classifiable
set of meanings. This contention in no way implies
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that the word “is” is devoid of meaning. Quite the
contrary: we are confronted with an “embarras de
choix” among the meanings of “is.”
What follows is a partial list of contexts in which the
question “What is mathematics?” is found. The list is
deliberately biased; it is meant to lead up to a conclu-
sion decided upon in advance.
“IS” AS DICTIONARY DEFINITION
Literally, the question “What is mathematics?” calls
for a “definition” of mathematics.
We have been trained to restrict the meaning of the
word “definition” to the role of definition in axiom-
atic mathematical systems. This mathematical sense
of the word “definition” will be henceforth disre-
garded. The senses of the
word “definition” in ordi-
nary discourse bear little re-
lation to mathematical defi-
nition.
The word “definition” oc-
curs in a great many vague
and unclear senses, which it
would be presumptuous to list. The most common,
as well as the most ambiguous is the “definition” that
we expect to find when we look up a word in a dictio-
nary.
What is a dictionary definition? In what sense do dic-
tionaries “define” words?
An old skeptical argument purports to prove that dic-
tionary definition is impossible. It runs roughly as
follows. Suppose you look up the meaning of word
A. The dictionary explains the meaning of A in terms
of words B, C and D, say. It may happen that B, C and
D categorically specify A as the sole word satisfying
certain conditions. But this happens very seldom.
More frequently, the dictionary explanation of A in
terms of B, C and D is likely to be a vague approxima-
tion to the meaning of A. The reader is asked to “get a
feeling” for A by various tricks: the explanation of A
in terms of B, C and D may be the description of a
general class of which A is a member, or it may be a
list of likenesses, of comparisons with other objects
that are meant to be “like” A; one reads various indi-
rect hints to the meaning to A. What cannot be given
in a dictionary is “the meaning” of A.
This frustrating remark by no means implies that the
reader will miss the meaning of A when looking up
A. The reader is expected to grasp the meaning of A
by letting his imagination roam “beyond” the vari-
ous statements in the dictionary that are meant to
“lead up to” the meaning of A. The meaning of A can
be grasped only when one looks “away” from the dic-
tionary explanations “towards” some other sense that
is not given there, but which the dictionary explana-
tions “point to.” No amount of explanation can make
sure that the reader will take the leap that will dis-
close the meaning of A.
The skeptical argument mistakenly concludes that no
definition can be “given” in the dictionary, except in
the eyes of the beholder.
The preceding argument
stands in contrast with what
actually happens when
someone looks up a word in
the dictionary. In point of
fact, people do find the
meaning of words in the
dictionary. If we look up the word “jaguar,” we will
get an adequate idea of a jaguar, even if we have never
seen a jaguar or know nothing about jaguars. When I
look up the word “chair,” I get a pretty good idea of
what a chair is, even if I do not quite grasp the full
meaning of what I have “read” until I become famil-
iar with actual chairs.
Dictionaries of synonyms are a further confirmation
of the same phenomenon. One learns the meaning of
a new word from approximate explanations, by a pro-
cess that cannot be rationally accounted for. When we
look up the synonyms of a known word, we are
searching for some word that we may never have seen.
We approximately guess the meaning of the syn-
onyms, even though these meanings are nowhere
given, and we select an appropriate synonym which
we may never have previously seen or used.
The non-rational grasping of the meaning of a word
from approximate explanations is an instance of the
phenomenon of the “copula,” of the function of “is”
in “A is B.” What matters here is that the “is” acts as a
copula only for certain A’s and B’s, like “jaguar” and
❝The skeptical argument mistakenly concludes
that no definition can be “given” in the dictionary,
except in the eyes of the beholder.
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“chair.” Certain other words pose a different problem
of “is” that is not subsumed in the “copula” sense of
“is.” One such word is “mathematics.” Any “math-
ematics is...” sentence given in response to the ques-
tion “What is mathematics?” will be evasive. No sen-
sible dictionary definition of “mathematics” can be
given.
“IS” AS INVITATION
The situation is different when we look up the word
“mathematics” in an encyclopedia rather than in a
dictionary. In an encyclopedia we find summaries of
entire mathematical fields, as well as a bird’s eye view
of various branches of mathematics and an ample bib-
liography that will guide us to learning mathematics.
Is the description of “mathematics” in an encyclope-
dia an adequate answer to the question “What is math-
ematics?” unlike the dictionary? Clearly not. The ex-
planation of “mathematics” that we find in an ency-
clopedia skirts the question by referring us, after an
enticing preamble, to technical expositions and clas-
sical treatises.
Both the dictionary “is” and the encyclopedia “is” are
motivated by the widely felt need of explaining eso-
teric words in exoteric language. This need roughly
dates back to the Renaissance, when the first dictio-
naries (in the contemporary sense of the term) were
compiled. Throughout history, notably in the Middle
Ages, no need for exoteric expositions was felt. Ex-
planations (often labeled “definitions”) were an in-
ternal affair for specialists, from which the public was
excluded. The scholastic definition of “Deus” as “eng
perfect-issimum” was meant to be shared by philoso-
phers and theologians only. Uttering such a statement
in the course a Sunday sermon at Mass might have
led to an accusation of heresy.
The Renaissance-Enlightenment notion of definition
as exoteric explanation is motivated by the democratic
ideal of a universal culture. Such a laudable objective
does not make exoteric explanation any easier. Fortu-
nately, an exoteric explanation of mathematics is sel-
dom what the questioner expects when posing the
question “What is mathematics?”. Let us see.
“IS” AS COPOUT
The question “What is mathematics?” is often asked
when the questioner has little or no acquaintance with
mathematics, and wants to discharge his or her duty
to learn something about mathematics, hoping for a
short answer.
The question “What is mathematics?”, asked to a
mathematician by a person ignorant of mathematics,
makes mathematicians uneasy. The mathematician
senses dishonesty in the abruptness of the question.
The questioner believes that an answer can be given,
similar to the answers one can give to questions like
“What is boeuf bourguignon?”, “What is yellow fe-
ver?” or “What are Magli shoes?”.
The questioner does not want to learn any mathemat-
ics when he asks the question “What is mathemat-
ics?”. The opposite is true: the questioner wants to
rid himself of the need of learning any mathematics
whatsoever. He wants to add to his conversational rep-
ertoire some brilliant answer that will permanently
excuse him from any further dealings with the sub-
ject.
One cannot escape the duty of giving a nutshell an-
swer to the question “What is mathematics?”, despite
the dishonesty of all short answers. Non-mathemati-
cians need to have some idea of what mathematics
“is” without having to study mathematics. They are
dealing with mathematics as outsiders, but their deal-
ings will affect the future of mathematics: mathemat-
ics requirements for schools must be determined by
professional educators; mathematical proficiency
among employees in a firm has to be gauged. Worst
of all, the allocation of research funds for mathemat-
ics is made by individuals who have at best a fleeting
acquaintance with the subject. Mathematics, like all
intellectual disciplines, is not economically self-sus-
taining , and since the beginnings of civilization math-
ematicians have depended for their survival on the
largesse of society or of a few wealthy individuals.
Mathematicians, like philosophers and artists, are
“kept” persons. In return, the public expects math-
ematicians to make the results of their work acces-
sible to cultivated persons who may have a passing
interest in mathematics, or who deal with the politi-
cal and economic problems of mathematicians.
We will leave to another occasion the tragedy that has
resulted from the mathematicians’ failure, going all
the way back to Pythagoras, of giving exoteric ac-
counts of their field that the public could appreciate.
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An accessible and short answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” may be difficult to give, it may turn
out to be dishonest and inadequate, but the mathema-
ticians’ failure to provide such an answer has been a
costly mistake.
“IS” AS ESCAPE
Students confronted with the task of learning a math-
ematical theory rarely feel the need to ask the pre-
liminary question “What is mathematics?”. They are
more likely to ask specific questions, such as “What is
topology?”, “What is the
Riemann hypothesis?”,
“What is a random vari-
able?”.
Suppose nevertheless, by
way of thought experiment,
that a student of mathematics were to ask such a ques-
tion, on the basis of his claim that an answer to the
question is a condition to be met preliminary to his
getting down to serious study.
It is likely that a teacher hearing such a question from
a student would give the student a strange look. The
teacher would be put on guard: is the student unfa-
miliar with grade-school mathematics? is the student
afraid of learning mathematics? does the student be-
lieve that an authorization is to be granted before un-
dertaking the study of mathematics? is the student
afraid of mathematics? does this student require medi-
cal attention?
In each of these instances, the teacher will not hazard
an answer to the question. Most likely, the teacher may
whisper to the student a few soothing words, not in
the least meant to provide any explanation of what
mathematics is, but rather meant to allay the anxieties
that the student’s question betrays.
“IS” AS SUMMING UP
Some mathematicians who are reaching the end of
their careers (Poincaré, Hadamard, Weyl), feel the
need to answer the question “What is mathematics?”
as a prop to their fading hold on the subject, much as
they might feel the need to write an autobiography.
In these circumstances, the question “What is math-
ematics?” is an excuse for excursions into the history
and philosophy of mathematics. The essays written
in answer to this rhetorically posed question will deal
with the “nature,” the “structure,” the “standing” of
mathematics. The “is” is once more skirted by being
turned into an “about,” into discussions about the
mathematics of the time, about future directions of
mathematics, about relationships among various
fields of mathematics.
“IS” AS IMPOSSIBLITY
We have argued that no answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” can be given in the form “mathemat-
ics is...” by examining some contexts in which the
question is asked. In none
of the instances considered
can the question be given
an answer of the form
“mathematics is...” In the
first instance an answer of
the form “mathematics
is...” may be read in a dictionary, but such an answer
is not taken seriously.
Are we to infer that no answer to the question “What
is mathematics?” can ever be given?
Let us call a word X a “pre-ontological term” when-
ever no adequate answer to the question “What is X?”
can be given in the form “X is...“ The preceding ex-
amples suggest that “mathematics” is a pre-ontologi-
cal term.
Most words of common usage are not pre-ontologi-
cal terms. For instance the word “chair” is not a pre-
ontological term, since we can answer the question
“What is a chair?” by sentences of the form “a chair
is...” An adequate such set of sentences will provide a
description of chairs that is good enough for most
purposes, even though no set of sentences may suc-
ceed in “defining” the word “chair” in the logical
sense. We use the word “item” to denote any word X
for which an adequate (though not necessarily logi-
cal) answer can be given to the question “What is X?”
in the form “X is...” “Chair,” “triangle,” “jaguar” are
items. Our claim is that there are pre-ontological terms,
and pre-ontological terms are not items.
The philosophical literature is rich in pre-ontological
terms: “time,” “world” and “nothing” are three pre-
ontological terms that have been studied in the phe-
nomenological literature. The question “What is
time?” has been deemed unanswerable by philoso-
❝Are we to infer that no answer to the question
“What is mathematics?” can ever be given?
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phers since St. Augustine. The question “What is
‘nothing’?” is obviously intractable. In Chapter 3 of
Sein und Zeit, Heidegger argues that “world” is a pre-
ontological term.
The limitations of the language by which we describe
and define items, a language made up of “A is B”-
type sentences, stand in the way of describing (let
alone defining) pre-ontological terms. One is forced
to choose between two alternatives: either to decide
that no sense can be made of sentences of the form “X
is...” whenever X is a pre-ontological term, or else to
find a sense of the word “is” that is distinct from the
“is” as copula in the language of items.
The first alternative was followed in phenomenology,
by an argument—the joint work of several authors—
that we will try to sketch.
What “common” features of the words “mathemat-
ics,” “time,” “nothing” and “world” lead us to clas-
sify these words under the heading of pre-ontologi-
cal terms?
The word “is” used as copula in “A is B” presupposes
a context of sense-making. A can only be B within a
background of unthematized features that are ordi-
narily passed over in silence. More formally: the “is”
of “A is B” presupposes a context within which the
“is” can “be.” For example, “chair” presupposes a
context of everydayness in which chairs are useful.
No item can “be” without some such background con-
text. “To be” is “to be-in-a-context.” We read, pro-
nounce, deal with the sentence “A is B” while pre-
tending that the meaning of the sentence is to be found
“in” the sentence itself, independently of any contex-
tual background. The canons of logic foster the pre-
tense of a decontextualized meaning of “A is B”; the
cliché sentences given as examples in logic textbooks
are carefully cleansed of contextual references. One
can hardly imagine any such sentences (“the snow is
white”) ever used in daily conversation. But when-
ever “A is B” is used meaningfully, i.e., contextually,
an unthematized background context can always be
brought to the fore.
The “is” in “A is B” purports to explain A in terms of
B. Such an explanation is made possible by a multi-
layered twine of contextual and intercontextual senses
that link A to B. Without such an underlying contex-
tual/intercontextual twine, no sense can be made of
“A is B.”
The “is” of “A is B” is meaningful if both A and B are
items, i.e., whenever both A and B are ensconced in a
common context. However, the statement “A is B”
becomes problematic when either A or B are pre-on-
tological terms. Pre-ontological terms are not items,
but conditions of possibility of the contextuality that
allows items to “be.” In plain words: no sentence of
the form “time is...” can make sense, because “time”
is not an entity of any kind, but a condition of possi-
bility of all entities.
However, the impossibility of making sense of any
“time is...” sentence does not deliver us from the prob-
lem of understanding the pre-ontological phenom-
enon of time. Rather, it points to the need for a lan-
guage other than the language of items that will be
suitable for the inquiry into the sense of time.
No “definition” of the term “mathematics” can de-
scribe that particular context that we call mathemat-
ics. Mathematics is not an item that certain contexts
share. Mathematics is the condition of possibility of
mathematical contexts. We cannot explain what math-
ematics “is” by sentences of the form “A is B,” where
A and B are items, because mathematics “is” no-thing.
The word “is” is misused when we try to explain what
mathematics “is” in the language of contextual items.
Questions like “What is mathematics?”, “What is
time?”, “What is the world?” are misleading. Math-
ematics, time and world are not items, and hence it
makes no sense to ask what they “are.”
“IS” AS A WONDER
Are we to conclude that the question “What is math-
ematics?” should be dismissed as meaningless? Such
a conclusion would be strikingly similar to the anath-
emas of the positivists, always ready to liquidate as
“meaningless” any question beyond the reach of their
narrow vocabularies. Besides, such a conclusion
would bring back the specter of normative philoso-
phy from which we have proudly distanced ourselves.
The question “What is mathematics?” is not always
asked by way of a copout, as in the examples above.
The question “What is mathematics?” is sometimes
posed, both by the student and by the mature math-
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ematician, to express a feeling of wonder, to signify
the estrangement that possesses us at times, the same
estrangement that is felt in the contemplation of the
starry sky and the moral law, described by Kant at
the beginning of his “Critique of practical reason.”
This feeling of estranged wonder is the opening to
philosophical inquiry, as Aristotle was first to note.
The question “What is mathematics?” may express the
feeling of the wonder at the contemplation of the
awesome edifice of mathematics.
The feeling of wonder that is sometimes expressed
by the question “What is mathematics?” is not likely
to be an “answer” to the question “What is mathemat-
ics?” It will be the start of a philosophical journey that
will eventually disclose of the “conditions of possi-
bility” of mathematics. The disclosure of such condi-
tions of possibility is the “answer” to the question.
Sadly, philosophers have neglected the task of giving
a rigorous formulation of the method of reasoning that
leads to the disclosure of conditions of possibility. If
the day ever comes when the “logic” of conditions of
possibility, i.e., philosophy, is developed with the stan-
dards of rigor that have been set by Fregean logic, then
an “answer” to the question “What is mathematics?”
will be possible in the form “mathematics is ...”
May be sung to the tune of the Eagles’ “Hotel California”
by Don Felder, Don Henley and Glen Frey.
On a dark desert highway—not much scenery
Except this long hotel stretchin’ far as I can see
Neon sign in front read “No Vacancy,”
But it was late and I was tired, So I went inside to
plea.
The clerk said, “No problem. Here’s what can be
done—
We’ll move guest in room N to the next higher one.
That will free up the first room and that’s where you
can stay.”
I tried understanding this as I heard him say:
Chorus:
“Welcome to the Hotel In...finity—
where every room is full (every room is full)
Yet there’s room for more.
Yeah, plenty of room at the Hotel In...finity—
Move ‘em down the floor (move em’ down the floor)
To make room for more.”
I’d just gotten settled, I’d finally unpacked
When I saw 8 more cars pull into the back.
I had to more to room 9;
 
others moved up 8 rooms as
well.
Never more will I confuse a Hilton with a Hilbert
Hotel!
My mind got more twisted when I saw a bus without
end
With an infinite number of riders coming up to check
in.
“Relax,” said the nightman. “Here’s what we’ll do:
Move to the double of your room number:
that frees the odd-numbered rooms.”
Repeat Chorus
Last thing I remember at the end of my stay—
It was time to pay the bill but I had no means to pay.
The man in 19 smiled, “Your bill is on me.
20 pays mine, and so on, so you get yours for free!.”
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